T he 'ultimate question' for a jury trying a case of medical manslaughter is whether the doctor's breach of duty was so serious as to constitute manslaughter. If the judge cannot find adequate words to describe the egregious behaviour that must be proved to convict a doctor of manslaughter, then the jury cannot be adequately directed by that judge as to what behaviour constitutes the crime. Equally, when faced with the decision of whether to lay the charge of manslaughter in the first place (which will initiate a trial), the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) must calculate whether, on the balance of probabilities, it will achieve a conviction. If the CPS, sharing the judges' dilemma, cannot describe what behaviour constitutes the crime (and cannot guess the likely jury verdict for the same reason), then its decision to charge equates to random selection.
Following two centuries of demonstrable uncertainty, the elements of this crime and their accurate description may have been settled. If not, an alternative approach for charging doctors involved in a potentially unlawful killing should be considered.
'Medical' manslaughter makes into a crime substandard clinical behaviour that otherwise (as 'negligence') would only attract a civil sanction. These parallel criminal and civil wrongs are distinguished by the scale of the substandard behaviour, when conjoined with the death of the patient. The English common law has struggled for nearly 200 years to properly articulate the quintessential ingredient of substandard care that when associated with patient fatality marks it out as deserving criminal conviction.
Currently, the law requires proof of 'truly exceptionally bad' behaviour by the doctor for the crime of gross negligence manslaughter to be established. Though the product of centuries of judicial and academic discussion, this test remains difficult to understand and results in regular appeals against conviction. This paper argues that the present test is unfit for purpose. It should be replaced by referring not to a standard of negligence but to a breach of the doctor's fiduciary duty -a betrayal of trust contrary to the best interests of the patient. This change would provide an intuitive concept, easier for juries to understand. Moreover, it would clarify the law such that the CPS would not embark on inappropriate investigations that ultimately fail both patient and doctor.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE MANSLAUGHTER
To provide context, it is instructive to review the development of the law from its early stages. Many of the successful appeals against conviction for medical manslaughter in the past 30 For two hours, with chloroform and various instruments, he attempted internal version of a breech presentation; the baby was dead on eventual delivery. Dr Bateman resisted the requests of the midwife and husband to admit his wife to hospital immediately. After eventual admission, she died a week later. The maternal postmortem examination revealed the remnants of a shredded uterus (most of which had been extracted with the baby), a perforated bladder and rectum, and sigmoid colon necrosis secondary to being pulverised against the sacral promontory.
Convicted of manslaughter because of her death, Dr Bateman appealed. mine whether the lapse in the standard of care amounted to a crime. In a judgement still referred to, he continued: 'In explaining to juries the test that they should apply to determine whether the negligence, in the particular case, amounted or did not amount to a crime, judges have used many epithets, such as "culpable", "criminal", "gross", 'wicked", "clear", "complete". But, whatever epithet be used and whether an epithet be used or not, in order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment.' The court in Bateman recognised the desperation of judges struggling to find epithets that distinguish negligence deserving of a criminal label from that which does not but the circularity remains. The use of 'gross' had long been regarded as ineffective, with Lord Cranworth famously saying in 1843 that there was no difference between negligence and gross negligence, apart from the addition of a 'vituperative epithet'. Nevertheless, subsequent trials built on this circularity while trying to better define the quantity or seriousness of that disregard for life that elevates the case from a civil wrong to a criminal act.
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'RECKLESSNESS' TO GROSS NEGLIGENCE MANSLAUGHTER
In 1937 Andrews appealed against his conviction for manslaughter. 4 He had knocked down a pedestrian when overtaking, carrying the victim on the bonnet before running him over in the van. He did not stop to help the victim. The court distinguished litigation in civil cases, which are blind to the degree of negligence, from criminal prosecutions, where the degree of negligence is central to whether a crime has occurred and the gravity of that crime. The court noted that there is an obvious difference in the law of manslaughter between doing an unlawful act (dangerous driving) and doing a lawful act with a degree of carelessness that an Act of Parliament makes criminal (driving without due care and attention). 4 Otherwise, the law would be constrained to prosecute for manslaughter the man who killed another while failing to drive with due care (the less grave, although criminal, offence of causing death by careless driving). It does not do so, requiring either the mens rea to do the unlawful act or a much higher degree of negligence to pass the manslaughter threshold ('unlawful act manslaughter' and 'gross negligence manslaughter' respectively). The appeal in Andrews introduced (but did not further define) 'recklessness' as the preferred epithet to describe the degree of negligence required to distinguish the crime of gross negligence manslaughter from a civil wrong.
In an early post-war case, Dr William Gray, an anaesthetist, pleaded guilty to manslaughter having neglected to notice that the oxygen cylinder he was using was empty and having failed to switch over to a full one. 5 The patient died of anoxic brain injury.
The sentencing court heard that on a number of occasions during the morning on which the child was being anaesthetised by Dr Gray, he inhaled anaesthetic gases; it transpired he had been addicted for seven years. He served a prison term and was struck from the medical register but was reinstated some years later having pledged to no longer give anaesthetics.
In the road traffic case of Lawrence, a motorcyclist had driven at 77 miles per hour through a built up area in Lowestoft, colliding with Yvonne Crowther as she crossed the road. 6 Killed instantaneously, her body was carried on the front of the bike for 45 yards. The case gave the House of Lords an opportunity to set out how 'driving recklessly' could be described by a judge in directing a jury. Among other things, the jury would have to be satisfied that the defendant was driving in the manner in which he did without having given any thought to the possibility of any risk or, having recognised that some risk was involved, had nevertheless gone on to take it (known as 'Lawrence recklessness'). Although this case was decided within the constraints of traffic legislation, in the later case of Seymour, a man who attempted to push his partner's car out of his way with the 11 ton lorry he was driving, only to crush her to death between the two vehicles, was convicted of her manslaughter. 7 Seymour appealed his conviction on the grounds that Lawrence recklessness was insufficient direction to the jury. The appeal failed but the Law Lords noted that in order to constitute manslaughter, the risk of death (caused by the manner of the defendant's driving) must be very high. In 1990 Dr Sargent was convicted of manslaughter. 8 Eschewing the use of a ventilator, he had emptied 1,020 litres of oxygen from a cylinder into a patient in Doncaster at a pressure of up to 20psi (1,040mmHg). The endotracheal tube was cuffed, permitting no leakage of pressure out of the airway. This caused fatal barotrauma to the patient's lungs and non-respiratory tissues. Intraoperatively, she became cyanosed, then more generally blue and bloated, so rapidly inflated that her skin became taut and translucent, with alarming limb swelling. She was described as reminiscent of the Michelin Man.
THE MODERN FORMULATION IN ADOMAKO -ABANDONING RECKLESSNESS
Having wavered between tests of recklessness and gross negligence, the modern formulation was defined in the case of Adomako. 9 This signalled the reversion from the recklessness approach in favour of 'gross' negligence.
In 1990 Dr Adomako was convicted after an anaesthetic death. 9 He had failed to notice that the oxygen supply of his anaesthetised and paralysed patient undergoing retinal surgery had become disconnected for 5 or 6 minutes. The jury was directed on Dr Adomako's degree of negligence, not recklessness. In 1991 Drs Prentice and Sullman were convicted following the death of a boy who died after the administration of intrathecal vincristine; in this case, the jury was directed on the basis of recklessness, not negligence.
10
Faced with a set of appeals against conviction based on this group of cases and another, 11 the Court of Appeal considered first the convictions of Drs Prentice and Sullman. Their convictions were quashed, on the grounds that the trial judge did not adequately direct the jury as to the extent to which (1) the failure to ascertain the correct route of administering the vincristine and (2) the failure to ensure that the correct route was adopted were 'grossly negligent to the point of criminality'. Had the directions to the jury left it open to them to consider gross negligence, which the appeal court found to be the correct issue, they may well have concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish that essential ingredient of the manslaughter.
In contrast, Dr Adomako's appeal on eight points relating to the trial judge's directions was rejected, the court finding no substance in the appellant's arguments. 11 In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal set out the 'true legal basis of involuntary manslaughter', which it defined as: (1) the existence of the duty, (2) a breach of the duty causing death and (3) gross negligence that the jury considers justifies a criminal conviction. Plainly, the final element inherited the problem of circularity and vagueness, requiring the act to be so bad that it was a crime. The court sought to assist further by setting out signs of gross negligence, which included, inter alia, (1) an indifference to an obvious risk of injury to health, (2) actual foresight of risk coupled with the determination nevertheless to run it, and (3) whether the defendant's inattention or failure to advert to a serious risk went beyond 'mere inadvertence'.
11 However, even here the fundamental problem of circularity remained since another indicator of the offence was whether the defendant's attempt to avoid a known risk was so grossly negligent as to justify conviction. In other words, was D's conduct a crime? Despite providing this formulation, the Court of Appeal closed by echoing existing pleas for a review of the law of manslaughter based on the growing evidence of inadequate and inconsistent direction of juries.
11 These inconsistencies were founded on the circularity in Williamson. Adomako appealed to the House of Lords on the basis that the trial judge had based his summing up on negligence alone, not considering recklessness. 12 The court found that it was not necessary for the trial judge to direct the jury on recklessness but perfectly open for him to do so as part of exposition of law. The appeal was dismissed. This marked the abandonment of the legal concept of recklessness in the context of gross negligence manslaughter.
POST-ADOMAKO -'TRULY EXCEPTIONALLY BAD'
Ten years later, two junior surgeons, Drs Misra and Srivastava, were accused of failing to investigate or react to the systemic postoperative deterioration of an otherwise healthy 33-year-old after repair of a patella tendon.
13
The patient died of sepsis. The court heard evidence of their failure to identify severe and persistent signs of infection (which would have been obvious 'from a glance at the relevant charts'), ignoring advice from other members of the medical team that further treatment was needed and failing to seek help from other doctors. This may have been the first time that the phrase 'truly exceptionally bad' was used by a judge to illustrate to a jury the degree of misconduct necessary to cross the threshold of criminal behaviour. Both doctors were convicted of gross negligence manslaughter. They appealed on the grounds that the offence was ill defined and uncertain, contrary to both article 6 ('Right to a fair trial') and article 7 ('No punishment without law') of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 13 Their appeal was dismissed, the Court of Appeal finding that while there was 'an element of circularity in the process by which the jury would arrive at its verdict', this did not make the offence of gross negligence manslaughter incompatible with the ECHR. The court nevertheless acknowledged the sustained judicial criticism of the offence. In 2015 Dr Bawa-Garba was convicted of manslaughter on the basis of a 'truly exceptionally bad' clinical response to streptococcal septic shock in a six-year-old child, Jack Adcock.
14 She sought leave to appeal the conviction on the narrow ground that the trial judge directed the jury using the wrong test. The direction used was to the effect that the child died 'significantly sooner' owing to substandard care whereas her defence asserted that the correct direction should have been that the child's life would have been 'significantly prolonged' ... but for the breach of duty. The court refused leave for appeal, finding that these two concepts were 'merely different sides of same coin'. The judge's direction on 'truly exceptionally bad' was not challenged during this application and in fact was cited with approval.
In Cornish, at the end of a prosecution case alleging that an anaesthetist should have immediately reintubated a patient in respiratory distress after a short general anaesthetic, the judge found that there was no case to answer. 15 However, the case provides a novel interpretation of 'gross':
'any such breach [that] fell so far below the standards to be expected [that] was so flagrant and so atrocious, that it would consequently amount to a crime'. This may be an indication that the formula 'truly exceptionally bad' is felt by some judges to be an insufficient phrase. In 2016 David Sellu, a surgeon, was convicted of the manslaughter of a patient who died following postoperative abdominal complications after elective total knee replacement. 16 He successfully appealed his conviction on the basis that the direction to the jury was flawed. The jury must be sufficiently assisted by the judge to identify the line that separates serious or very serious mistakes and lapses from conduct that was truly exceptionally bad (ie such a departure from the standard of the reasonable doctor as consequently to amount to being criminal). The appeal court found that the judge had failed to make this distinction to the jury. The judgement in Rose 17 provided the Court of Appeal with an opportunity to set out the current elements of gross negligence manslaughter that the prosecution must prove to gain conviction. In doing so, the court summarised the conduct needed to reach the threshold of manslaughter. Perhaps seeking to clarify Adomako, it stated that the circumstances of the breach of duty should be 'truly exceptionally bad and so reprehensible as to justify the conclusion that it amounted to gross negligence and required criminal sanction'.
18
It remains to be seen whether it will lead to more considered decisions over charging doctors with manslaughter but circularity plainly remains. The extension to 'truly exceptional' may simply be another example of the addition of further 'vituperative epithets' that Lord Cranworth found so unsatisfactory in 1843.
3
The report of the rapid policy review of gross negligence manslaughter in healthcare led by Professor Norman Williams notes a marked decline in conviction rates in the most recent cases.
19 Since 2013, 6 convictions resulted from 15 prosecutions, compared with 17 convictions from 32 prosecutions between 1994 and 2013. While the conviction rate may have marginally diminished, the annual number of convictions remains constant over the past 25 years, at an average of one per year. Furthermore, for the clinicians who have endured a legal process that ultimately ends in acquittal, the (failed) prosecution will have had a profound effect on their lives, family and career. The 'falling' conviction rate may seem an otiose point in these circumstances, a pyrrhic victory.
AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION -THE BETRAYAL OF TRUST
As identified above, the crux of the problem with the present law is that it is both circular and difficult to understand, given the vague and tautologous character of 'truly exceptionally bad'. There is an alternative to articulating the offence of gross negligence manslaughter in terms of the breach of a duty of care and that is to do so on the basis of a betrayal of trust, based on the fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient.
20
The fiduciary is a feature of equity, a species of law that is distinct from the common law but good law nevertheless. Classically, fiduciary duties arise in relationships of trust within the context of financial or business affairs: trustees owe a fiduciary duty to the trust's beneficiary, 21 solicitors owe a fiduciary duty to their clients, 22 company directors owe a fiduciary duty to the company 23 etc. However, fiduciary relationships may also arise in circumstances normally unrelated to financial matters. For example, the relationship between a guardian and his or her ward is fiduciary,
24
and that between a spiritual adviser and the devotee may also be described in this way.
25
It is trite law that the categories of fiduciary relationship remain open 26 and so can adapt to fit relationships where equity requires. While a conclusive definition of 'fiduciary relationship' has eluded both courts and commentators for centuries, the Supreme Court recently approved the following definition of Lord Justice Millett: a fiduciary (ie the holder of the duty) is 'someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence'. 27 It gives rise to a legitimate expectation that the fiduciary will act in good faith 28 and not in a way adverse to the interests of the person to whom the duty is owed. 29 The fiduciary must not act for their own benefit in conflict with the benefit of that person. 28 It is, fundamentally, a relationship of responsibility and loyalty.
30
As doctors, our obligation is never to betray patients' trust, always to act in good faith and not adverse to their interests; this is a fiduciary duty. A patient's consent is not a defence to betrayal, 31 underlining the unilateral and unconditional nature of this obligation. In medicine, elements of fiduciary duty already operate in the UK with the duty of candour 32 and confidentiality.
33
The duty is arguably applicable to some categories of improper sexual relationships 34 between doctors and patients. It has been recognised in Canada in the context of the doctor-patient relationship.
35
Although the English courts have yet to formally state that fiduciary duties apply to doctors, the authority to the contrary 36 is old and predates the now routinely cited definitions for the meaning of a fiduciary relationship. It has also been the subject of academic criticism. 37 While there are bound to be some differences between the fiduciary relationship of a doctor and patient and, for example, a trustee and beneficiary (such as the ability of the latter to consent to a breach of the fiduciary duty), 38 there are substantial similarities. When viewed in the context described above, it is hard to see how at least some form of fiduciary relationship does not arise between the doctor and patient. The obligation of trust is what marks out doctors as different and justifies outrage when that trust is betrayed. This was recently articulated by a judge in a criminal case where a surgeon branded his initials on newly transplanted livers. In his sentencing remarks, the judge described this desecration as 'an abuse of power and a betrayal of trust that these patients had invested in [him]'. 39 If one of these patients had died as a result of the diathermy injury, prosecution on the basis of betrayal of trust would have been far more relevant than on the breach of duty of care. If the concept of betrayal of trust is incorporated into the ingredients of the offence as a replacement for the test of 'truly exceptionally bad', the matter would become far more straightforward than assessing where the doctor's failure lay along the gradient of breach of duty. It is something that a human being can recognise almost intuitively and therefore something that a jury would be able to analyse with far more ease. Whether or not the patient's trust was betrayed becomes a binary question both for the jury and the CPS.
Far from this being a confusing question for a jury, there is precedent for its clarity found in the current criminal law. For example, the offence of fraud by abuse of position requires the jury to assess whether the alleged fraudster breached the position of trust held towards the victim.
40 Again, the question is binary: was there an abuse of trust or not?
The proposal would also remove the confusion and conflation between systemic and personal breaches of duty; the (sometimes obvious) contribution to the death made by failures of hospital management and governance would be judged on the basis of breach of duty, entirely distinct from the doctor's putative breach of trust. If the organisation's substandard care was no longer concealed by the doctor's alleged or actual shortcomings, it seems likely that any systemic criminality of the hospital or general practice would receive more focused attention. The death of a patient following the failure of a junior doctor to treat the patient appropriately may fall below the standard of care but this may not be considered a breach of trust once it is revealed tha t the doctor had been compelled to perform the operation without being properly trained or provision of appropriate equipment.
It could be argued in response that a 'betrayal of trust' test imposes too high a threshold for the offence. For example, it would potentially mean that a doctor could escape criminal liability, no matter how incompetent he or she was, as long as the doctor did not betray the trust of the patient, acted in the patient's best interests and did so in good faith.
The obvious response to this is to bear in mind that a conviction for involuntary manslaughter is a criminal matter attracting a criminal penalty. This often means substantial terms of imprisonment. For that reason, it is right that only a transgression of the utmost gravity should result in conviction. An honest mistake made in good faith may well not be sufficient for criminal liability, although it will almost certainly be sufficient for civil liability (and therefore compensation). In these circumstances,
If the concept of betrayal of trust is incorporated into the ingredients of the offence as a replacement
for the test of 'truly exceptionally bad', the matter would become far more straightforward asking a jury in a criminal trial to consider the matter by reference to negligence is unhelpful.
To draw an analogy, a solicitor who is negligent in conducting a client's financial affairs may be liable in the civil law of tort (a breach of the duty of care) but will not necessarily have breached their fiduciary duty 41 nor committed a criminal offence. However, a breach of fiduciary duty (being a breach of their position of trust surrounding those financial affairs) may render them guilty of the criminal offence of, for example, fraud by abuse of position of trust.
42
The reader could consider the facts of the foregoing cases to test the hypothesis that 'betrayal of trust' is a practicable touchstone leading to a just result.
CONCLUSIONS
The legal basis for prosecution and conviction for gross negligence manslaughter in the 19 th and 20 th centuries has failed to provide prosecutors, judges and juries with sufficient certainty as to what constitutes the offence. It remains to be seen whether 'revised guidance' or a plea for clearer understanding of the elements of the offence of gross negligence manslaughter as set out in the 2018 rapid policy review will be a sufficient remedy to allay doctors' fears, or whether an entirely new approach is required. If the latter, then founding the charge on the basis of a betrayal of trust between the patient and his or her doctor may represent a concept that the jury can recognise and empathise with. If a jury can understand a binary decision of betrayal versus non-betrayal, the judge's task of direction will be simplified and it will be less ambiguous, providing certainty. At the same time, the CPS may find it easier to identify the rare cases of betrayal of trust that merit prosecution.
